Chapter Three

Anarchism, Poststructuralism and the Politics of Sexuality: 'Sexual Orientation' as State-Form

Every daring attempt to make a great change in existing conditions, every lofty vision of new possibilities for the human race, has been labeled Utopian.

-- Emma Goldman, *Socialism: Caught in the Political Trap*

The political, ethical, social, philosophical problem of our days is not to try to liberate the individual from the state . . . but to liberate us both from the state and from the type of individualisation which is linked to the state.

-- Michel Foucault, *The Subject and Power*

Anarchism is a broad label incorporating a diverse range of political theory and practice. These diverse traditions share in common is a belief that it is both possible and desirable to live without rulers, authority or other relationships of domination. The word 'anarchy', popularly used to describe chaotic situations, is derived from the Greek *anarkhia*, meaning 'without authority'. Often seen as a political and ethical philosophy that advances ideas of human nature, anarchism can also be understood as a theory of organisation that offers alternatives to bureaucratic and capitalist standards (Ward, 1982). Anarchist historian Rudolph Rocker suggests that anarchism should be understood as a 'definite trend in the historic development of mankind' to strive for freedom (cited in Chomsky, 1970). Commenting on this, Noam Chomsky argues it is impossible to pin down anarchism as a singular object.

> One might ask what value there is in studying a 'definite trend in the historic development of mankind' that does not articulate a specific and detailed social theory. Indeed, many commentators dismiss anarchism as utopian, formless, primitive, or otherwise incompatible with the realities of

a complex society. One might, however, argue rather differently: that at every stage of history our concern must be to dismantle those forms of authority and oppression that survive from an era when they might have been justified in terms of the need for security or survival or economic development, but that now contribute to -- rather than alleviate -- material and cultural deficit. If so, there will be no doctrine of social change fixed for the present and future, nor even, necessarily, a specific and unchanging concept of the goals towards which social change should tend. Surely our understanding of the nature of man or of the range of viable social forms is so rudimentary that any far-reaching doctrine must be treated with great skepticism, just as skepticism is in order when we hear that 'human nature' or 'the demands of efficiency' or 'the complexity of modern life' requires this or that form of oppression and autocratic rule (1970).

Defining anarchism in terms of practical organising that is contingent on historical circumstances avoids reducing it to the writings of dead theorists such as Peter Kropotkin, Michael Bakunin and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. Furthermore, such definitions challenge the common critique that anarchism is impractical. Colin Ward goes one step further than Rocker and Chomsky:

How would you feel if you discovered that the society in which you would really like to live was already here, apart from a few little, local difficulties like exploitation, war, dictatorship and starvation? The argument of this book is that an anarchist society, a society which organises itself without authority, is always in existence, like a seed beneath the snow, buried under the weight of the state and its bureaucracy, capitalism and its waste, privilege and its injustices, nationalism and its suicidal loyalties, religious differences and their superstitious separatism (1982:14).

For Ward (1982, 2004), anarchism is a living philosophy upon which social life depends. Indeed, the common characteristics of anarchist politics -- mutual aid, free association, and direct democracy -- are lessons learned from studying everyday life. While some argue non-hierarchical large-scale social organisation is impossible, even when documenting the negative health impacts of hierarchy, (Marmot, 2004) I argue that social life could not exist without people helping each other, even if that mutual aid might simultaneously result in the oppression of others (e.g., old boy networks). Life without mutual aid would be the war of all against all described by Hobbes. Even under the most authoritarian regimes of twentieth-century Europe, people co-operated to resist authority.

Anarchism can be understood as an effort to identify, support and encourage

encourage libertarian practices concomitant with hierarchical capitalist society. As anarchist sociologist Paul Goodman writes, 'a free society cannot be the substitution of a 'new order' for the old order; it is the extension of spheres of free action until they make up most of social life' (cited in Ward, 1982:14). Such efforts have obvious implications for the politics of sexuality, though such a connection is rarely made in academic writing on the subject. Anarchist history includes a number of influential theorists who advocated 'sexual liberation' as a crucial aspect of human liberation, including Edward Carpenter, Herbert Marcuse, Wilhelm Reich, A.S. Neil, Charles Fournier and Emma Goldman (Haaland, 1993). While the liberationist perspective of sexuality as a natural force to be set free enabling the possibility of unconstrained human nature is problematic in light of constructionist and poststructuralist theories, the influence of anarchism on the politics of sexuality is rarely acknowledged. Emma Goldman, an anarcho-feminist in the early 20th-century American anarchist milieu spoke positively about homosexuality and was also active in campaigns for women's reproductive freedom. On the subject she wrote, 'To me anarchism was not a mere theory for a distant future; it was a living influence to free us from inhibitions, internal no less than external, and from the destructive barriers that separate man from man [sic]' (1988 [1931]: 556). She was also very active in campaigns for women's reproductive freedom. More recently, Alex Comfort is much better known for *The Joy of Sex* than for his anarchist politics, though these were not separate interests. His first book on sexuality was based on a series of lectures given at the London Anarchist Group in the late 1940s and was published by Freedom Press in 1948 -- a time in British history when no mainstream publisher would consider such a work (Ward, 2004). He made the connection between anarchist politics and sexuality more explicit in his (1973) *More Joy: A Lovemaking Companion to the Joy of Sex:*

> acquiring the awareness and the attitudes which can come from good sexual experience does not make for selfish withdrawal: it is more inclined to radicalise people. The anti-sexualism of authoritarian societies and the people who run them does not spring from conviction (they themselves have sex), but from the vague perception that freedom here might lead to a liking for freedom elsewhere. (cited in Ward, 2004:72).

Indeed, fears of 'sexual anarchy' have often been used to justify the existence of authoritarian organisation. As Judy Greenway wrote, 'Critics of anarchism have always claimed that anarchism would mean sexual licence, the absence of restraint, shameless women and irresponsible men indulging every passing lust. In such images, which mingle fascination and disgust, sexual order and political order are tied (or handcuffed) together' (1997:171). So it is

not surprising that queer activism and theory, often seen to promote 'sexual anarchy', have also contributed to the anarchist tradition of sexual politics.

Queer Anarchy

Contemporary queer political traditions have had three major influences: poststructuralist theory, feminism, and the direct action activism of groups such as ACT UP (AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power). Each of these, in turn, can be understood as part of the anarchist tradition. For now, I focus on queer and feminist activism and return to poststructuralist theory below. The connections between anarchism and feminism are diverse and variable as are each of these traditions. Much of liberal feminism, for example, offers criticisms of neither State nor capitalist forms of organisation (e.g., Friedan, 1974). Likewise, some Marxist[1] feminists see value in seizing the State (e.g., Ebert, 1995; MacKinnnon, 1989). At the same time, radical feminist politics, including lesbian feminism, have often been critical of all relationships of domination. For many radical and lesbian feminisms, male domination of women, and thus compulsory heterosexuality, is rejected as inherently authoritarian, and providing a model for all forms of domination (e.g., French, 1985; Rich, 1993). Unfortunately, radical and lesbian feminist claims to privileged subject positions result in vanguardism and relationships of domination (discussed in the Chapter Two), which consistent forms of anarchism seek to avoid. Peggy Kornegger (2002) has made explicit the connection between US second wave feminist organisation and anarchist politics.

> In rebellion against the competitive power games, impersonal hierarchy, and mass organisation tactics of male politics, women broke off into small, leaderless, consciousness-raising groups, which dealt with personal issues in our daily lives. Face-to-face, we attempted to get at the root cause of our oppression by sharing our hitherto unvalued perceptions and experiences. We learned from each other that politics is not 'out there' but in our minds and bodies and between individuals. [...] the structure of women's groups bore a striking resemblance to that of anarchist affinity groups within anarcho-syndicalist unions in Spain, France, and many other countries. Yet, we had not called ourselves anarchists and consciously organised around anarchist principles (p27).

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1   Despite the popular association of Marxism with Leninist tactics, Marx's writings included libertarian elements inspiring traditions which share much in common with anarchist politics, including a radical critique of seizing the state (e.g., Cleaver, 2000; Hardt and Negri, 2001, 2005), though some argue that even these retain key problematic features of Marxism (e.g., Day, 2005).

Unfortunately, the anarchist influence has been lost in many feminist groups. Radical lesbian collectives seeking funding offered by the Greater London Council in the 1980s, for example, found their politics and organisational structure incompatible with that of the council bureaucracy. This more often lead to changes in collectives, including the development of hierarchies, rather than any changes to local government (Green, 1997). More generally, consciousness-raising groups seem to have largely given way to the post-feminism of 'girl power'. Yet anarchic feminism is not consigned to the dustbins of history, despite the visible dominance of liberal (feminist) politics. Feminist groups often choose anarchist forms of organisation as being more compatible with feminist politics than the masculine characteristics of bureaucracy. The 1980s saw the very visible anarchist feminism of Greenham Common women's peace camp (Roseneil, 1995, 2000). On a smaller scale, many feminist institutions, including women's shelters and libraries, are collectively organised, rejecting hierarchy (Byington et al, 1991; Charles, 2000; Collins et al, 1989; Matthews, 1994; Reinelt, 1994; Stedward, 1987). Women's collectives are still discussing the personal and political and organising events (see e.g., Poldervaart, 2003; The Cailleach Collective, 2004). Anarchic feminism is also an active force in the contemporary global anti-capitalist movement (see e.g., PGA women, 2002).

Anarchism can also be found within 'queer' activism. ACT UP, cited by queer theorists as an inspiration (e.g., Butler, 1993 and Halberstam, 1993), uses anarchist forms of organisation and political tactics. ACT UP is a network of non-hierarchical autonomous groups practising direct action and civil disobedience. Actions are organised not by a centralised command structure, but through self-organising 'affinity groups'.

> Affinity groups are self-sufficient support systems of about 5 to 15 people. A number of affinity groups may work together toward a common goal in a large action, or one affinity group might conceive of and carry out an action on its own. Sometimes, affinity groups remain together over a long period of time, existing as political support and/or study groups, and only occasionally participating in actions. [...] Affinity groups form the basic decision-making bodies of mass actions. As long as they remain within the nonviolence guidelines, affinity groups are generally encouraged to develop any form of participation they choose (ACT UP/NY, 2004).

Decisions within affinity groups and larger regional networks are made through consensus, a non-hierarchical form of decision-making process. Through an emphasis on civil disobedience, ACT UP explicitly criticises the legitimacy of the prison and 'justice' systems as helping to

maintain relationships of domination. Finally, ACT UP emphasises the importance of solidarity, especially with those imprisoned by the State apparatus. Again, despite the much higher visibility of the pink pound and LG(BT) lobbying groups, queer anarchist activism continues. The 1980s and 90s saw queer anarchist zines including AQUA (Anarcha Queers Undermining Authority) (Dye, 1989) in the US and the Passion Brigade (date unknown) in the UK. Also in the UK, HOMOCULT (1992) combined an aggressive sexualised class analysis and transgressive language (e.g., 'common queer nigger bitch' and 'shitstabbers'), with a radical critique of more mainstream sexual activist groups in a creative collection of direct propaganda: flyposters, stickers and graffiti. They argued against identity-based lobbying groups: 'We say fuck minority politics. The only minority we see are the pathetic rich who try to control us. HOMOCULT have set about its ultimate plan -- the destruction of the "moral" state' (p1). And, concerning the direct action group Outrage, they write, 'Outrage is a cosy sham. You can only be outraged by what surprises you. It's no surprise to common queers that there is no justice for us. We are not outraged --we are defiant' (p 4). Angry at a politics that emphasise sexual orientation oppression in isolation from other forms of hierarchy, especially capitalism, activists have organised alternatives. Gay Shame, founded in San Francisco and spreading, and La Di Dah (not Mardis Gras) in London mock the profiteering and power games of mainstream lesbian and gay politics.

> GAY SHAME is a virus in the system. We are committed to a queer extravaganza that brings direct action to astounding levels of theatricality. We will not be satisfied with a commercialized gay identity that denies the intrinsic links between queer struggle and challenging power. We seek nothing less than a new queer activism that foregrounds race, class, gender and sexuality, to counter the self-serving 'values' of gay consumerism and the increasingly hypocritical left. We are dedicated to fighting the rabid assimilationist monster with a devastating mobilization of queer brilliance. Gay Shame is a celebration of resistance: all are welcome (Gay Shame, 2004).

Some of the activists involved in organising La Di Dah also began a new tradition of queer D.I.Y. (self-organised) autonomous spaces called Queeruption. Welcoming 'queers of all sexualities', Queeruptions have been held in London (1998, 2002), New York (1999), San Fransisco (2001), Berlin (2003), Amsterdam (2004), next year in Sydney and Barcelona. Although each is initially organised by a collective, the division between 'organisers' and 'participants' is broken down as much as possible during the event, with everything from

communal vegan cooking and running workshops to cleaning up and skipping food (i.e., retrieving edible food past its 'sell by date' from skips) done by self-organising volunteers. Furthermore, in a rejection of capitalist claims of property ownership and an effort to make events as low-cost as possible, events are held in squatted buildings (Queeruption, 2004). Queer anarchist action is not limited to Europe, North America and Australia/New Zealand. British anarcho-queer spoof paper, *The Pink Pauper*, reports other examples (Anonymous, 2004). In Israel, Black Laundry challenges the leftist status quo which argues that the occupation is the primary political issue, and challenges all forms of hierarchy. In Buenos Aires, an anti-capitalist radical queer group have created a social centre and support a variety of non-hierarchical events. Mujeres Creando ('Women Creating'), an anarcha-feminist group in Bolivia, includes challenging homophobia as a crucial part of its revolutionary politics. These examples, from ACT UP to Mujeres Creando, demonstrate an ongoing, though not inherent, relationship between anarchism and queer politics.

Criticisms of Queer

While anarchism must necessarily challenge hierarchies of gender and sexuality in order to be consistent with a critique of all forms of domination, 'queer' need not necessarily be anarchist (see Brown, 1996). Queer politics have been criticised on numerous fronts and their congruence with anarchist ideals has been challenged. Firstly, queer politics have been criticised, especially by Marxist and materialist feminists (see e.g., Ebert, 1995, 1996; Glick, 2000; Hennessy, 2000; Jackson, 2001), for promoting individualistic sexual transgression that is consistent with capitalism. Secondly, queer theory has been charged with monopolising sexuality as its domain of study and thus neglecting feminist theories of sexuality and displacing the importance of gender. Thirdly, queer politics can maintain a degree of homocentrism if built around the lesbian and gay identities it had sought to deconstruct. And finally, queer stands accused of romanticising textual deconstruction and a cultural politics of knowledge to the neglect of institutional (Seidman, 1997) and material engagement (Ebert, 1995, 1996; Glick, 2000; Hennessy, 2000). While these criticisms are of course intertwined, I look at each in turn.

Queer Transgressions

Queer theory and politics are often seen as promoting transgressive practices,

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particularly 'queer' sexual practices, rather than addressing systematic inequalities. Strategies focused on transgression may ultimately reinforce the rule that they attempt to disrupt. As Wilson argues, 'just as the only true blasphemer is the individual who really believes in God, so transgression depends on, and may even reinforce, conventional understandings of what it is that is to be transgressed' (1993: 109). As I have argued earlier, neither citizenship nor transgression offers a basis for the production of a radically different social order as both depend on an acknowledgement of the legitimacy of dominant contemporary order(s). Elisa Glick criticises sex-positive feminist and queer theories for encouraging us 'to fuck our way to freedom' (p 19). She suggests that influential writers such as Gayle Rubin and Judith Butler valourise transgressive sexual practices as performative 'subversive repetitions' that challenge discursive productions of normal. Sadomasochism, drag and butch/femme, Glick argues, are promoted as a form of sexual vanguardism. In addition to the problems of promoting particular sexual practices as revolutionary, each of these is taken out of its economic context. Queer constructions of butch/femme as a performative critique of heterogender rarely acknowledge the working-class and racialised historical constructions of these identities and their perceived essential nature. Likewise, sadomasochism, particularly in the form of sex work, is produced within a capitalist context. Finally, camp and drag arguably embody particular racialised and classed constructions of gender (hooks, 1992). To what extent does individual play with power or gender challenge the dominant organisation of either? Indeed, as Glick asks, 'how do sexually dissident styles reproduce relationships of domination' (p 28)? Perhaps queer politics share more with the right-wing libertarianism of *Playboy* than with an anti-capitalist analysis. Similarly, Teresa Ebert (1995) advocates a red feminism in response to 'ludic feminists' such as Judith Butler whose discursive politics, she argues, neglect the material. While Ebert considers the theories of Butler, Foucault, and others to be anarchist, her understanding of anarchism as compatible with capitalism is grounded in the definition of US right-wing academics who defend the 'libertarian' individualism of the 'free' market (e.g., Friedman, 1975; Nozick, 1974; Rothbard, 1978) rather than the libertarian socialist tradition of anarchism described above.

> The post-al [sic] politics being put forth by Lyotard, Cornell and other ludic theorists and feminists, such as Judith Butler, is basically an anarchic notion of politics. Its primary goal is individual freedom from *authority* rather than emancipation from socio-economic *exploitation*. [...] Liberation is seen as freedom from authority, from regulation, from any

constraints on the free play of the possibilities of (sexual) differences. [...] Such a post-al freedom (post-authority, post-state, post-class, post-production) is disturbingly close to the demands (desires) of the 'new' aggressive entrepreneurial anarchism of late capitalism that is so evident in the backlash against health care reform and affirmative action in the U.S. and the increasing strength of right-wing politics and racism both in the U.S. and in Europe. This entrepreneurial anarchism is passionately, even violently, committed to a completely unfettered freedom for the individual to pursue profit unconstrained by the state and any obligation to the social good. [... T]he post-al politics of [...] ludic feminists, is quite unable to challenge the effects of entrepreneurial anarchism. Instead, the *effects* of ludic claims for the unrestricted play of (sexual) differences, for the unrestricted freedom of individual desires, reinforce this aggressive individualism. There is very little difference -- in their effects -- between ethical feminists and free market entrepreneurs in late capitalism (Ebert, 1995).

Although I contend that Ebert and Glick misread Butler, Rubin and Foucault, the fact that such a reading is possible suggests that queer theory has not adequately elaborated the relationships between sexuality and capitalism. Indeed, as Rosemary Hennessy (2000) argues, recognising the ways in which capitalist social relations are instrumental in the production of identity categories is not to replace a politics of sexuality with politics of class, but to extend 'queer politics to queer-y feelings between sexual identity and exploitation' (p 68). Politics reliant on transgression provide fuel for commodification. As queer zine writer Craig Willse (2004) argues, it is important to recognise the specificity of cultural transgressions rather than applying a blanket class analysis. Criticising Thomas Frank, coeditor of *Commodify Your Dissent*, Willse writes:

> Frank writes of these critics as if they are generic scholarly bodies, and he ignores the fact that they are in particular working in feminism and queer theory. By ignoring this, he does not have to grapple with the fact that most feminists and queers are terribly starved for subversive images which betray the structures of gender and sex that we all collide with every day. Rather than simply dismissing this critical writing, it is perhaps more useful to ask: how might queer/feminist people produce radical versions of gender and sex that also challenge the capitalist marketplace? How do we make change when sometimes it feels like our only hope for revolution is, in fact, the television?

Clearly, recognising the inseparability of hierarchies is necessary for queer politics to develop its anarchist heritage.

Queer Gender

As I argued in the previous chapter, the feminist sex wars lead to a division between authoritarian forms of cultural feminism and sex-positive feminism. It was the latter that provided an important grounding for the development of queer theory. For example, Gayle Rubin has influentially argued that feminism is not necessarily the most appropriate framework for understanding sexuality, which should be understood as constituting an axis of oppression not reducible to gender. Rubin's argument was in direct response to the development of a feminist framework constructing women as victims in need of State protection from masculine sexuality (MacKinnon, 1989). In opposing this particular analysis, Rubin was not contending feminism should limit itself to commenting on gender or consider the analysis of sexuality the exclusive preserve of gay, lesbian and queer studies. As Judith Butler argues, 'if sexual relations cannot be reduced to gender positions, which seems true enough, it does not follow that an analysis of sexual relations apart from an analysis of gender relations is possible' (1994:9). This move on the part of gay and lesbian studies or queer theory as a new academic interdisciplinary realm, Butler suggests, is a dangerous effect of the 'conservative force of institutionalization' that must necessarily be criticised 'in the rush to acquiring new legitimacy' (p 21). Indeed, she argues, the same practices that attempt to fix feminism as the old and queer as the new could result in the 'institutional domestication of queer thinking' which would be 'its sad finish' (p 21). Rather, recognising the complexity of oppression requires a rejection of proper objects of study.

> [B]oth feminist and queer studies need to move beyond and against those methodological demands which force separations in the interests of canonisation and provisional institutional legitimation. For the analysis of racialisation and class is at least equally important in the thinking of sexuality as either gender or homosexuality, and these last two are not separable from more complex and complicitous formations of power (Butler, 1994:21).

Crossing institutional boundaries and refusing to claim a proper object of study has been a strength much queer theory. Intersections of queer and feminist thought have provided an antinormalist gender critique and have moved beyond binary divisions of man/woman, gender/sex and mind/body. Queer feminists, among others, have challenged the category of 'woman' as a basis for political activism. Returning to criticism of transgression, queer theory potentially produces its own forms of normalisation and hierarchy.

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> Feminist identifications have, at times, intended to enjoin women to be alike by being visibly different from conventional norms of femininity, in the direction of gender neutrality or nonspecificity, which is also, of course, gendered. Queer emphases on antinormative display enjoin us to be different from conventional norms of femininity by defiantly cross-identifying. Conceptually, then, as well as politically, something called femininity becomes the tacit background in relation to which other positions become figural and mobile (Martin, 1994:119).

Like Butler, Biddy Martin is concerned by a queer theory which represents itself as fluid, open and radical in contrast to a feminism (and female body) which is constraining and ultimately conservative. This simultaneously makes sexuality, as the object of queer theory, as 'the means of crossing, and to make gender and race into grounds so indicatively fixed that masculine positions become the emblem again of mobility' (p 110). The academic claim to sexuality as queer territory, criticised by Butler and Martin, which results in the development of hierarchies -- of politics and knowledge (queer over feminist), gender (transgressive over conventional and masculine over feminine), and oppressions with potential for destabilisation (sexuality over gender and race) -- is incompatible with anarchist politics.

Queer Homocentrism

Queer theory and politics developed through criticising of the limitations of gay and lesbian identity politics. Whether through identification with or against gay and lesbian, queer is constructed around homosexuality. Thus, queer is something of a contradictory project. Eve Sedgwick writes that, 'Queer can refer to: the open match of possibilities, gaps, overlaps, distances and resonances, lapses and excesses of meaning when the constituent elements of anyone's gender, of anyone's sexuality aren't made (or can't be made) to signify monolithically'. At the same time, queer also refers to homosexuality, and 'for anyone to disavow those meanings, or to displace them from the term's definitional center, would be to dematerialize any possibility of queerness itself' (Sedgwick, 1993:8). In many discourses, including activist ones, queer is much more likely to refer to the second definition than the first (Gamson, 1996; Halperin, 1995), thus, 'simply reinscribing the exclusive understanding of sexual identities' (Rahman, 2000:127). Judith Butler (1993) questions the possibility of reclaiming a term that has historically produced a subject through shaming and pathologisation. She argues that the history of the word is not erased through 'reclamation',

but lingers in any usage. For this reason, 'queer' suffers similar problems to 'gay', enacting what Foucault has referred to as a 'reverse discourse'. The signification of queer as deviant risks the production of a new normalising category, in which all forms of sexualised (and gendered) transgression become understood as variations of a single category. This is realised with the development of queer as an inherently exclusive, albeit broad, identity. Indeed, the capacity to claim the term can be influenced by locations of class, ethnicity, age, religion, sexuality and other aspects of life experience and social practices. Queer theorists provide a valuable critique of identity politics but in emphasising the hetero/homo division and especially gay and lesbian identities,'queer theory' risks acting as a more critical version of gay and lesbian studies. Queer approaches rarely address bisexual (Hemmings, 2002; Young, 1997) and transgender identities, let alone move outside the four boxes of contemporary liberal LGBT identity politics. At the same time, queer theory focuses much more on homosexuality than on heterosexuality. Queer feminist work (especially Butler) provide the major exceptions (see also Thomas, 2000). This emphasis on homosexuality is not simply a problem of queer theory, but is rooted in a sociological tradition where research is focused on deviant or 'marked' social categories rather than those considered 'unmarked' such as heterosexuality (Brekhus, 1998). One of the most important insights of queer theory is that the hetero/homo binary is implicated in all aspects of 'Western' social knowledge and organisation. To limit this insight to a focus on homosexuality would be a great loss.

Queer Culture

Queer theory suggests that the strength of male domination and heterosexism is not simply due to tradition, prejudice or socialisation, 'but a basic way of organising knowledges and fields of daily life which are deeply articulated in the core social practices of Western societies' (Seidman, 1997: 157). Queer emphasises the cultural politics of knowledge and a deconstructionist assault on the hetero/homo dichotomy. 'Although discursive interventions certainly have material effects on the production of the real, how exactly the resignification works towards political and social change needs to be explained' (Glick, 2000: 33). Even the father of deconstruction suggests that discursive approaches cannot be separated from institutional analysis.

> What is somewhat hastily called deconstruction is not ... a specialised set
> of discursive procedures ... [but] a way of taking a position, in its work of

analysis, concerning the political and institutional structures that make possible and govern our practices ... Precisely because it is never concerned only with signified content, deconstruction should not be separable from this politico-institutional problematic (Derrida, quoted in Seidman, 1997: 156).

Clearly, knowledge is an important terrain for political activism. But, if 'sexual orientation' is also integral to the organisation of economic and political systems, action limited to cultural forms is unlikely to bring about the radical social change necessary to eliminate the hetero/homo division at the centre of queer critique.

Addressing Criticisms

These criticisms can largely be addressed through returning to the anarchist roots of queer politics. The argument that queer promotes an individualistic politics compatible with neoliberalism are only comprehensible if one fails to recognise the possibility of (communist) anarchism. Teresa Ebert (1995) clearly points out that the work of Butler and Foucault is opposed to State authority.

Ludic theories of power in feminism are aimed at displacing any centralized or systematic exercise of political, social or symbolic authority. These theories, however, take the state (not capital) to be the primary arena for the exercise of centralized power. For instance, the Foucauldian analytic is fundamentally anti-Statist with its critique of juridical and sovereign theories of power and substitution of diffuse, dispersed and anti-authoritarian -- because indeterminate, acausal, contingent and reversible -- theories of power.

Ebert's Marxism neglects the libertarian tradition when she insists upon the 'revolutionary necessity of appropriating [State] power'. But one need not be committed to the Marxist ideal of State socialism to fail to take seriously the anarchism of queer theory. Steven Seidman is also confused by the radical individuality promoted by queer theory.

Despite its critique of methodological individualism or the view of the individual as the source and centre of knowledge, society, and history, much queer theory, at least its deconstructive currents, is wedded to a social vision whose ultimate value lies in promoting individuality and tolerance of difference; where queer theory does not edge into an anarchistic social ideal it gestures towards a democratic pluralistic ideal (Seidman, 1997: 157).

Although he uses the label anarchist to describe queer politics, he never acknowledges, much less examines, the theoretical and activist traditions that go along with that word. This mistake is repeated by queer theorists and leaves them open to charges of promoting a politics compatible with capitalism. Similarly, while most of the queer activisms described above proclaim an anti-capitalist politics, it is not always entirely clear how their actions aim to produce alternative forms of production, consumption and exchange or to ameliorate poverty and alienation.

Queer does not necessarily have to be understood as transgressive. It does necessarily promote breaking the rules that produce the hetero/homo division. But breaking rules for the sake of breaking rules is merely transgressive. Breaking rules to produce new realities is prefigurative. 'Prefiguration, the demonstration or rehearsal or sample of how life can be in a better world is usually but not always transgressive' (Greenway, 1997: 175). Prefigurative politics are central to anarchism, which refuses to construct a division between ends and means (i.e. consequentialism). Bookchin noted 'it is plain that the goal of revolution today must be the liberation of daily life. ...there *can be no separation of the revolutionary process from the revolutionary goal*' (Bookchin 1974: 44-45 original emphasis). More recently, Cindy Milstein has argued that the contemporary anarchist 'movement is quietly yet crucially supplying the outlines of a freer society … where the means themselves are understood to also be the ends' (2000). Prefigurative queer politics, then, do not simply defy or mock the heter/homo division, but create cultural resources, forms of organisation, relationships and networks, that not only resist normalisation but support and enable antinormalist realities. Again, some of the examples I described earlier, Queeruption and Greenham in particular, should be understood as prefigurative rather than simply transgressive.

More specifically, though, queer politics has been criticised for promoting transgressive sexual practices. These might only be seen as prefigurative in a limited sense of what an individual (or couple or group) would like their sexual life to be like. Thus, Glick's reading of queer politics as a promotion of the possibility of 'fuck[ing] our way to freedom' (2000:15). How, for example, can sadomasochism be understood to be prefigurative rather than transgressive?

In reference to a man who pays to be spanked, diapered, breastfed, or

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forced to 'crawl around the floor doing the vacuum with a cucumber up his bum' ..., we need to ask what material changes are effected once the investment banker has removed the cucumber from his ass and returned to his office? (Stabile, quoted in Glick, 2000:40)

Indeed, this example is clearly transgressive rather than prefigurative, particularly as the dominant discursive regime in which both the sexual acts and our man's life exist are structured by non-consensual capitalist relationships of domination and submission. More generally, however, BDSM can be considered play, both in the theatrical and pleasure-oriented senses of the word. Thus, 'domination' in this context is as much like being queer-bashed as losing at Monopoly is like poverty. What would the workplace be like if we had safewords, or negotiated the conditions of our labour as equals? Liz Highleyman (1997), in an anarchist analysis of BDSM, argued that,

> SM play involves interpersonal power exchange, which is diametrically opposed to real world authoritarian roles, which are typically unidirectional. One participant is always on top, and the other is always on the bottom. Except in rare circumstances, the victim of the cop, soldier, or warden does not have the opportunity to 'exchange' any power whatsoever. Pat Califia has noted that perhaps the reason erotic dominance and submission is so threatening to the established order is because SM roles are so fluid.

Similarly, although writing on a very different subject and not from an explicitly anarchist perspective, social theorist Barry Barnes emphasised the importance of differentiating between different meanings of the word hierarchy.

> Hierarchy may voluntarily be constituted, on the spot and temporarily, by the unconstrained action of those involved, to hunt, for example, or to fish or to climb. Members may actively seek subordinate rather than superordinate positions in such ad hoc hierarchies, and find no difficulty resuming normal equal relationships once the task at hand has been accomplished. Thus, when we look at the semi-permanent bureaucratic hierarchies of modern industrial societies and note how they make social power differentially available, we should take care not to conflate the evaluation of those systems with an evaluation of hierarchy *per se* (1995: 193-94).

Anarchism, much like ethical BDSM, rejects the legitimacy of stable hierarchies that result in real forms of domination for consensual and fluid power relations. As Foucault pointed out,

all relationships, and thus all forms of organisation, involve power (1980). While domination (real or play) always involves power, power does not always involve domination. Sadomasochistic sexual practices, along with some other 'transgressive' forms of sex, can thus be seen as prefigurative as they promote an alternative ethic of fluid relationships of power, of active consent, and an ethic of pleasure (see also, Albury, 2002; Warner, 1999). Not all forms of 'transgressive' sex are prefigurative of queer anarchist realities. Rejection of actual (not play) domination clearly eliminates rape, sexual assault and harassment from the list of acceptable sexual activities and necessitates complex discussions about intergenerational sex involving young people. At the same time, it is important to recognise that a wide variety of sexual practices can embody queer/anarchist/feminist ethics and that no particular (consensual) sexual practices are more or less revolutionary than others. The danger of associating transgressive sexual practices, or even sexual practice in general, with sexual radicalism has been opened up for discussion within queer anarchist networks (A Queeruption Berlin working group, 2003). More importantly, in order for queer politics to successfully disrupt the hetero/homo division, it must also disrupt all the hierarchical binaries with which it is intertwined. These hierarchies must be challenged in *all relationships*, not only sexual ones.

Criticisms of queer theory claiming particular territory from feminism are easily addressed. Anarchist politics aims to eliminate all forms of domination and should draw upon whatever tools are consistent with that aim, whatever their label. As relationships of domination are increasingly recognised to be deeply interconnected, reducing the validity of analysis based on class, race, sexuality, gender or other social divisions as independent social formations, it makes sense to turn to anarchist theory to understand relations of domination and other forms of anarchist practice to challenge them. Although certain strains of anarchist politics (i.e., a rigid class struggle anarchism) may prioritise one area of domination over others, contemporary anarchist politics address a wide variety of oppressions and their intersections in particular locations (e.g., Jeppesen, 2004; Notes from Nowhere, 2003). At the same time, queer theory should not be limited to a focus on homosexuality. The homocentrism of activism labelled 'queer' may be more difficult to escape. Like anarchy, it is a term that should be used tactically with sensitivity to other people's likely assumptions about the meaning of the word and consequently their ability to feel included. A queer politics enacted entirely by 'queers' is as likely to remain as ineffective as an anarchist politics enacted only by 'anarchists', or indeed any politics enacted only by 'activists' (Anonymous 2000a and 2000b). In either case, the aim should not be to recruit people to a particular label, but to encourage

critical thought and action for social and environmental justice (see Heckert, 2002).

This does require a cultural politics of knowledge, but cannot be limited to that. Anarchist politics depend upon a combination of cultural critique and alternative knowledge production with prefigurative practices of mutual aid. A cultural politics of knowledge is necessary for enabling people to view (possibilities of) reality differently from the perspectives encouraged through authoritarian discourses of corporate media and State propaganda and the racist, sexist, heterosexist, etc. relationships of domination upon which they depend and which they encourage. In 1950s and 60s France, the Situationists, a group of anti-authoritarian Marxists, argued that capitalism cannot be resisted by seizing the State apparatus but can be subverted through alternative aesthetic practices (Debord, 1971 [1967]; Vaneigem, 1994 [1967]). They advocated détournement, that is the practice of modifying capitalist 'signs', such as advertisements, to change the message and encourage the viewer to recognise the manipulative nature of capitalism. This tactic, now more commonly referred to as 'subtervising', is still popular among anti-capitalist activists (see e.g., Klein, 2000). The slick Canadian magazine Adbusters takes advantage of graphic design software to produce 'subverts' that are indistinguishable from adverts, apart from their content. An anarchist cultural politics of knowledge also involves a more direct production of alternative discourses through film, fiction, news (e.g., Indymedia), and art (see e.g., Antliff, 2003; Jordan, 1998; Moore, 1998). Indeed, the greatest popular experiment in anarchist organisation in recent history, the Spanish revolution of 1936-1939 (see e.g., Acklesberg, 1991; Bookchin, 1997) depended as much upon the 'cultural' as upon anarcho-syndicalist unions which seized the means of production, women's collectives which challenged sexism, and other forms of institutional change (Cleminson, 2003). As important as cultural forms of resistance are, it is not sufficient to write about how the State, the university and the liberal individualism of capitalism depend upon a hetero/homo division or to do queer readings of Shakespeare. A successful queer politics must also engage in direct action to address human needs and desires, inhibit relationships of domination and develop alternatives to authoritarian institutions. As Steven Seidman argues, 'If we are to recover a fuller social critical perspective and a transformative political vision, one fruitful direction is to articulate a politics of knowledge with an institutional social analysis that does not disavow a willingness to spell out its own ethical standpoint' (1997: 161). A closer look at the anarchism of poststructuralism, the third root of queer politics, helps us to do that.

The Anarchy of Poststructuralism

Debates on the political value of poststructuralist philosophy, particularly intense in the 1990s, have been dubbed the 'theory wars' (Duggan, 1998). Poststructuralist writing has been criticised for its inaccessibility. Furthermore, while philosophers such as Foucault and Deleuze have identified themselves as radical, their work has rarely addressed activist struggles directly (Dempsey and Rowe, 2004). The problem here is the limited interaction between theorists and activists, rather than inherent limitations in the political value of poststructuralist philosophy. Among the most outspoken left academic critics has been Barbara Epstein who charges poststructuralism with inhibiting progressive politics.

> The version of poststructuralism that has been adopted by feminists and other progressives mostly has had the effect of undermining social analysis, replacing concern for social change with concern for intellectual and aesthetic sophistication. . . . The principles that dominate radical poststructuralism, including anti-essentialism, the rejection of metanarratives, the insistence that everything must be understood as socially constructed, the rejection of claims of truth or value, are exaggerated versions of one-sided, partial insights. Poststructuralism is not driven by some secret plot to destroy progressive movements, but it nevertheless has the effect of disorienting efforts toward a progressive analysis (cited in Duggan, 1998).

It is precisely the principles that Epstein denigrates that have developed through the radical activism I described in the previous chapter. Criticisms of essentialist feminism or gay politics have been put forth by those excluded by singular definitions (see also Duggan, 1998). If, as I have suggested, radical politics should answer the question of how to challenge relationships of domination without producing new ones, then the recent history of gender and sexuality politics demonstrates the value of these principles. Dempsey and Rowe (2004), also responding to Epstein, suggests that perhaps her greatest difficulty with poststructuralism is that it has no intention of providing a single analysis on which to provide the basis for 'progressive politics'. One of the defining characteristics of poststructuralist political philosophy is the impossibility of a grand theory to eliminate all forms of domination, because a grand theory (truth-claim) is a discursive act of domination.

According to Dempsey and Rowe, the theory wars in North America were finally silenced by the success of the anti-capitalist-global demonstration in Seattle in 1999. Here was

a clear example of successful poststructuralist political activism. The events in Seattle, and subsequent demonstrations/disruptions of G8 and WTO summits, have been based on diverse and decentralised networks consistent with poststructuralist advocacy of difference. This is consistent with Foucault's advise on preventing fascist tendencies arising in revolutionary practice: 'Prefer what is positive and multiple, difference over uniformity, flows over unities, mobile arrangements over systems. Believe that what is productive is not sedentary but nomadic' (Foucault, 1983:xiv). I suggest that one key root of the theory wars was a result of limited imagination, the incapacity to perceive a politics based on neither categorical identities or political parties that rejected all forms of domination and exclusion. Besides its inaccessibility, I suggest the main reason poststructuralist political philosophy has remained so incomprehensible is because its politics are neither individualistic nor programmatic, but anarchist.

Dempsey and Rowe are not the first to argue for an anarchist reading of poststructuralism. Gayatri Spivak and Michael Ryan (1978) wrote an early article drawing similar conclusions. Ryan described the politics of Foucault and Deleuze as

> a rejection of authority of any kind whatsoever (be it right or left), [...] that the only political alternative is a perpetual revolt which dances constantly out of the grasp of the Master in the hope of a future free from mastery; a condemnation of reason as a weapon which reinforces mastery in the form of state power; and finally (and it is this which has earned them notoriety) an arraignment of Eurocommunism, as well as of Marx and socialism in general, as a modern Master whose inevitable expression is Gulag. An anarchist like Bakunin might have smiled benevolently, paternally upon them (pp 67-68).

More recently, Todd May (1989, 1994, 1995), Saul Newman (2001) and Lewis Call (2003) have argued that poststructuralist philosophy should be seen as a new stage in anarchist politics, respectively dubbed 'poststructuralist anarchism', 'postanarchism' and 'postmodern anarchism'. Their work has been taken up by activists and intellectuals. The growing examination of intersections of poststructuralism and anarchism is visible in active online networks, fora and listserves (see e.g. Adams, 2003) as well as academic and activist writing on the anarchism and poststructuralism of the alternative globalisation movement (e.g., Carter and Morland, 2004; Chesters, 2003; Epstein, 2001; Graeber, 2002; Notes from Nowhere, 2003; Sheehan, 2003; Starhawk, 2002; Tormey, 2004).

The trend to see the poststructuralist writings of Deleuze and Foucault, among others, as a new form of anarchism has not gone without criticism. Jesse Cohn and Shawn Wilbur (Cohn, 2002; Cohn and Wilbur, 2003) are optimistic about the value of poststructuralist thought to anarchist projects, but critical of constructing a poststructuralism as 'the new anarchism' in opposition to an out-of-date and philosophically naive 'classical anarchism'. May, Newman and Call all depend, to varying degrees, on defining classical anarchism in terms of doctrine as written by European notables such as Bakunin, Kropotkin and Proudhon. This is problematic for a number of reasons. First, it neglects the complexity of ideas on topics such as power and human nature within the writings of these men. Second, it ignores the writing of other key figures of this period, including anarcha-feminists such as Emma Goldman and Voltairine de Cleyre, whose ideas challenged the postanarchist representation of 'classical anarchism' (see Dark Star Collective, 2003). Third, it produces anarchism as a fixed object from the past rather than an ongoing tendency in human history, which is always specific to socio-historical contexts. This very representation of anarchism, problematic in poststructuralist terms, allows the authors to produce their various 'post' anarchisms as new and oppositional, when it might be more accurate to acknowledge the reciprocal relationships between developing traditions of anarchism. This is the more open approach to intersections of poststructuralism and anarchism advocated at the Postanarchism Clearinghouse, whose introductory line is 'neither the normalization of classical anarchism nor the depoliticization of poststructuralism' (Adams, 2003).

An Anarchist Poststructuralist Framework

My aim is to develop the possibilities for understanding the ongoing construction of 'sexual orientation' through intersections of poststructuralism and anarchism, while drawing upon queer and feminist politics. If, as I have implied, anarchist ideals can be seen both in criticisms of compulsory sexuality (heterosexual, lesbian, or transgressive) and in attempting to develop anti-authoritarian ethics and relationships (antipatriarchal, antihomophobic, or antinormative), then this approach is not particularly original. However, I suggest that an explicitly anarchist critique of sexual orientation is valuable in recontextualising histories, understanding contemporary experiences, and developing new forms of social relationships and movement.

Despite the limitations of Todd May's (and others') arguments for French poststructuralist theory as a *new* anarchism, I have found the framework he develops under that name to be very valuable for understanding this concept we call 'sexual orientation'. Furthermore, it helps to address the limitations ascribed to poststructuralist and queer theories. Seidman (1997) among others has been concerned by the failure of queer theorists to specify any ethical commitments. Todd May (1994) argues that while poststructuralist theorists may resist spelling out their ethical principles in order to avoid producing a foundation from their anti-foundational critiques, one can nonetheless find an unspoken ethics within this body of work. May's framework entails five conceptual components, including ethical principles: 1) structure and power as decentralised, relational and non-deterministic forces, which are continuously produced by human action; 2) a rejection of essentialist humanism for a performative understanding of human identity; 3) a radical ethical critique of representation; 4) an ethical commitment to difference; and, 5) a multivalue consequentialist understanding of both history and ethics. These components intersect to produce not only tools for understanding social life, but for radical social change.

Structure & Power: the continuous and pluralistic production of social reality

In his effort to explore the relationship between anarchism and French poststructuralism, Todd May suggests that we can differentiate between a 'tactical' politics from those which he terms 'strategic'. The defining characteristic of May's notion of strategic political philosophy is that it 'involves a unitary analysis that aims toward a single goal' (p 10). For Marxism, this would be the capitalist economic system or for certain feminist philosophies, gender relations. In these cases, all forms of oppression and injustice can be reduced to a singular source (e.g. capitalism or patriarchy). This source, then, is the centre from which all power emanates. This conception of centralised power underlies the strategic notion that particular subject positions can be better placed to understand and address the problematic of power. Thus, traditional Marxist groups incorporate a party vanguard who claim power in the name of the proletariat. Cultural feminism is similar in this respect in the suggestion that women (especially lesbian women), by virtue of their oppressed status, possess particular knowledge of the social world and are placed to produce revolutionary change.

Some poststructuralist theory, on the other hand, defines a tradition of tactical political philosophy. A tactical approach argues that there is no centre of power, that it is

irreducible to any particular source (e.g. capitalism or patriarchy). Instead, Deleuze and Guattari, for example, use a metaphor of the rhizome to describe power -- neither has a centre, a beginning or an end; both form complex intersecting patterns. Likewise, Foucault suggests that power is exercised in multiple forms, through diverse social relations and in 'dispersed, heteromorphous, localised procedures' (1980: 142). It was the anti-authoritarian student and worker uprisings of Paris 1968 that inspired and encouraged Foucault to carry on with his efforts to understand relations of domination outwith those traditionally analysed by Marxism.

> Where [USSR State] power was in question, its opponents called it totalitarianism; power in Western capitalism was denounced by the Marxists as class domination; but the mechanics of power in themselves were never analysed. This task could only begin after 1968, that is to say on the basis of daily struggles at grass roots level, among those whose fight was located in the fine meshes of the web of power. This was where the concrete nature of power became visible, along with the prospect that these analyses of power would prove fruitful in accounting for all that had hitherto remained outside the field of political analysis. To put it very simply, psychiatric internment, the mental normalisation of individuals, and penal institutions have no doubt a fairly limited importance if one is only looking for the economic significance. On the other hand, they are undoubtedly essential to the general functioning of the wheels of power. So long as the posing of the question of power was subordinate to the economic instance and the system of interests which this served, there was a tendency to regard these problems as of small importance (Foucault, 1980:116).

Although Foucault had begun to explore the issue of power before 1968, it was his experience of radical social change that spurred him on. While Guattari had long been politically active, Deleuze was to become deeply politicised by the events of 1968. Only after these revolutionary days did Deleuze become involved with political movement and activism, including the *Groupe d'Information sur les Prisons* (GIP) initiated by Foucault and others. He also worked in support of the Palestinian and homosexual people and in opposition to the Gulf War and the French nuclear strike force (Patton, 2000). In a sense, then, the suggestion that Foucault and Deleuze invented a new form of anarchism (May, 1994) fails to recognise the activist and anarchist contexts within which their work developed (see also Halperin, 1995:25-26 on Foucault).

This anarchist approach to social organisation might also be understood as recognising structures as internal to human relations rather than as sources of power outside the social realm. Thus, poststructuralism does not, as some have suggested, deny the reality of

either domination and oppression, or the apparent stability of 'structures' such as capitalism and government. Rather, theorists such as Foucault and Deleuze argue that structures are not fixed, nor are they historical forces that are simply maintained, but that these apparent structures are *continuously produced* through social relations. In theory, people could choose to produce very different forms of social organisation (including anarchism) by changing the nature of their social relationships. This argument is continuous with elements of 'classical' anarchism. German anarchist Gustav Landauer, a contemporary of Bakunin, declared that:

> The state is not something which can be destroyed by a revolution, but is a condition, a certain relationship between human beings, a mode of human behaviour; we destroy it by contracting other relationships, by behaving differently (quoted in Ward, 2004:8).

In practice, such activity is difficult, but not impossible. Such action, however, requires a tactical approach -- the application of power within local and specific contexts. If, as Foucault and Deleuze argue, power has no centre, then the vanguardist approach promoted by Leninist-Marxism and lesbian feminism must be rejected. Likewise, Ebert's (1995) criticism of Foucault (and Butler) as anarcho-capitalists who fail to recognise the exploitation of capitalism misinterprets Foucault's anarchism. It is not simply the State, as a set of juridical and disciplinary apparatuses, that Foucault opposes, but the State-like relationships of power (e.g., disciplinary, penal or psychiatric) whose cumulative effects *are* the State; simultaneously, the state apparatus depends upon such decentralised relationships of power and obedience in order to exist. Echoing Landauer, Foucault elaborated this point with respect to the relationship between the family and the State:

> The family, even now, is not a simple reflection or extension of the power of the State; it does not act as the representative of the State in relation to children, just as male does not act as its representative with respect to the female. For the State to function in the way it does, there must be, between male and female or adult and child, quite specific relations of domination which have their own configuration and relative autonomy (Foucault, 1980: 187-188).

As capitalism, like the State, depends on dispersed relationships of domination, Foucault's work should clearly be understood as anti-capitalist. If oppression is experienced in diverse locations and is produced by the intersection of various forces, it is difficult to imagine that any one group of people can claim a social position that better enables them to politically

address these problems than anyone else. In this respect, the work of Foucault and Deleuze is very much anarchist in that it rejects vanguardism and promotes an ethic of decentralised social action. At the same time, in recognising the multiplicity of the State, poststructuralist theorisation often surpasses other aspects of anarchist thought in acknowledging the internal contradictions of the State[2] (e.g., Pringle and Watson, 1992).

Importantly, then, power cannot be understood as suppressive, but productive. Power does not emanate down from the State, but the State may be considered that name which we give to the oppressive effects produced through decentralised relations of domination, surveillance, representation and control. According to 'stateless theories of the State', the State is a discursive effect rather than an autonomous agent outside of social relations (see Jessop, 2001 for overview). Likewise, relations of power can also produce more desirable effects, in anarchist terms, such as food cooperatives, workplace resistance, community organisation or the production of anarchist theory. This analysis is important for (sexual) politics, for, as Todd May (1994) argues,

> if power is conceived as operating not upon its objects but within them, not 'from above' but 'from below,' not outside other relationships but across them, this entails that power is not a suppressive force but a creative one, giving rise not only to that which must be resisted but also, and more insidiously, to the forms resistance itself often takes. That is what makes specific political analysis necessary: if power creates its own resistance, then the liberation from specific forms of power must take account of the kind of resistance that is being engaged in, on pain of repeating that which one is trying to escape (73).

While both lesbian feminism and sexual citizenship aim to undermine relations of domination, their success in this regard must necessarily be limited. This limitation is due in part to the discursive nature of power: to claim access to the 'truth' of the best strategy for liberation, one is necessarily making of unquestionable authority – an act of domination. Likewise, these strategies depend upon surveillance and policing, that is the production of knowledge or its it for its determining who is inside and who is outside the charmed circle of either sisterhood or citizenship. As Foucault has argued (1975, 1980), knowledge and power are inseparable.

Practising/Producing the Embodied Self

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2 While Post-Marxist theorisation of the State also challenges the notion of a monolithic institution (e.g. Laclau and Mouffe, 1985), it fails to escape the liberal logic of representation and the state apparatus (Day, 2005).

One of the challenging claims of poststructuralist theorising is that subjectivity itself is an effect of relationships of power. This fundamentally destabilises the liberal social contract theory which imagines a pre-social subjects who agrees to particular social arrangements rather than subjectivities produced by those arrangements. In queer theory, this has been popularised in Butler's formulation of gender performativity and a general commitment to anti-essentialism. Indeed, this provides the core to rejecting not only identity politics, but more the nuanced theoretical development of sexual citizenship. For these politics depend upon a belief, or at least a pretence, that there are gays and lesbians, rather than gay and lesbian subjectivities that are constituted through particular relations of power. Although the deployment of power is inextricable from ongoing productions of knowledge, the social significance of discursive production is not limited to the intellectual - subjectivities are embodied. Recent developments in feminist poststructuralist theory (e.g., Butler 1990, 1993; Gatens, 1996; Grosz, 1994, 1995; Rafanell, 2003), in particular, argue that human bodies are themselves, in a very important sense, constructed.

Feminist theorising has long assumed a sex/gender distinction where the former is a fact of nature and the latter is a social product (Harrison and Hood-Williams, 2002). Indeed, feminism as identity politics benefits from the category of 'women' having an unquestioned, if not *quite* essential, ontological status; the 'naturalness' of the material body has been called upon to provide this. But, asks Judith Butler (1993), what puts the body outside the realm of that which is constructed? Indeed, isn't the very discursive act of *placing* the body outside an aspect of its construction as natural? More importantly, she asks, what relations of power, what social exclusions are hidden from investigation if the 'truth' of bodies is beyond question?

The supposed truth of sex, which can be imagined to be read off of bodies, Butler argues, is better read as the effect of 'regulatory schemas that produce intelligible morphological possibilities' (p14). In her formulation, 'sex' is produced through the continuous discursive reiteration of its supposedly pre-discursive existence. In this sense, she argues, 'sex' is very much like law. In challenging the 'truth' of sexed bodies, and simultaneously the truth of law, Butler provides an invaluable resource for both queer/feminist challenges to naturalised heterosexism and anarchist challenges to legal

authority.

> The presumption that the symbolic law of sex enjoys separate ontology prior and autonomonous to its assumption is contravened by the notion that the citation of the law is the very mechanism of its production and articulation. What is "forced" by the symbolic, then, is a citation of its law that reiterates and consolidates the ruse of its own force. What would it means to "cite" the law to produce it differently, to "cite" the law in order to reinterpret and coopt its power, to expose the heterosexual matrix and to displace the effect of its necessity? (p15)

In other words, sex, like law, is a process rather than an accomplished fact (whether imagined to be natural or social). Indeed, neither can be fully accomplished. The power of either to demand obedience and conformity is dependent upon claims of authority, of truth, being continuously produced through reiterated citation (e.g., 'because it's the law, ma'am'). Therein lies the possibility for resistance, for nothing *requires* us to reiterate or cite the law (of sex or otherwise) obediently. Rather, we may feel capable, in particular contexts, of citing selectively and creatively a number of sources to produce reality differently. However, the first act of the law is to create bodies afraid to resist. 'There must be a body trembling before the law, a body whose fear can be compelled by the law, a law that produces the trembling body prepared for its inscription, a law that marks the body *first* with fear only then to mark it again with the symbolic stamp of sex' (p101).

Fearful and obedient embodied subjectivities are produced, in part, through the discursive construction of a dualist hierarchy of mind over body. This division has been influential in the development of sociology, with its critique of biological determinism, perhaps disguising a fear of corporeality, resulting in a neglect of the body in sociological theory until recently (Turner, 1996). This neglect may also be understood as an effect of hierarchies of men and masculinity (associated with mind) over women and femininity (associated with body) as well as hierarchies of sexuality where particular practices and desires are constructed as irrational or out-of-control (uncivilised bodies). As these concerns are essential to queer and feminist interventions in academia and elsewhere, the importance of the body has increasingly been acknowledged in sociological work. Anarchism must share these concerns, not only because of its critique of hierarchy in general, but also because of the ways in which gendered and sexualised constructions of the body are used to produce fearful and obedient subjectivities.

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Can it be that in the West, in our time, the female body has been constructed not only as a lack or absence but with more complexity, as a leaking, uncontrollable, seeping liquid; as formless flow; as viscosity, entrapping, secreting; as lacking not so much or simply the phallus but self-containment -- not a cracked or porous vessel, like a leaking ship, but a formlessness that engulfs all form, *a disorder that threatens all order*? [...] The metaphorics of uncontrollability, the ambivalence between desperate, fatal attraction and strong revulsion, the deep-seated fear of absorption, the association of femininity with contagion and disorder, the undecidability of the limits of the female body (particularly, but not only, with the onset of puberty and in the case of pregnancy), its powers of cynical seduction and allure are all common themes in literary and cultural representations of women. But these may well be a function of the projection outward of their own corporealities, the liquidities that men seem to want to cast out of their own self-representations (Grosz, 1994:203; emphasis added).

Does not this construction of the female body indicate a desire for and fear of anarchy - a disorder that threatens all order? Does that anarchy of (women's) bodies threaten all order, or merely those authoritarian forms of order that depend upon fantasies of intellectual certainty and truth, fantasies of controllable and controlled bodies/desires/intimacies? These are the authoritarian fantasies Judith Butler challenges when she questions the very nature of bodies. 'To problematised the matter of bodies may entail an initial loss of epistemological certainty, but a loss of certainty is not the same as political nihilism. On the contrary, such a loss may well indicate a significant and promising shift in political thinking. This unsettling of "matter" can be understood as initiating new possibilities, new ways for bodies to matter' (1993:30).

It is no wonder that recent developments in queer, feminist and poststructuralist work provoke strong emotion - whether fear, desire, both or otherwise. Not only do they challenge dominant understandings of the political, but simultaneously and necessarily they challenge are very understanding of our bodies, ourselves. The extent of this challenge, I suggest, is difficult to take on board if one assumes the necessity of the State. Arguing that subjectivity, including to a significant degree our very embodiment, is produced through relationships of power is not simply a 'theoretical' problem, but an ethical one. But, as many have asked, how can this translate into practical politics?

Part of the dilemma of Queer activism is created by the institutionalised procedures of democratic engagement and the need therein for some form

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of representative identity and ... [that] this need for essential political identity is a central dilemma for any politics of social oppression (Rahman, 2000: 128).

The answer lies in politics without representation.

An Anti-representationalist Ethic

'The first ethical principle to which poststructuralism is committed is that practices of representing others to themselves -- either in who they are or in what they want -- ought, as much as possible, to be avoided' (May, 1994:130).

In rejecting the notion of a human (or gay, etc.) essence, it is consistent to reject the humanist notion of discovering and cultivating this essence. If indeed the epistemological project of 'understanding' an essence is at the same time a political project of defining and constraining human potential, then we must understand representation of a subject or a category of subjects as an act of violence. This violence applies to acts of representation in both senses of the term. To claim the authority to speak for another is a violation of that person's capacity to define themselves, which they must have some ability to do if they have no essence. 'Practices of telling people who they are and what they want erect a barrier between them and who (or what) they can create themselves to be' (May, 1994:131). This is not to suggest a voluntaristic notion of the self, where one can choose who or what they want to be in the same sense that one can choose one's wardrobe. Identity is produced through numerous relations of power and social practices, over which one can only have limited control. To inhibit people's capacities to make themselves the selves they want to be, through engagement in particular social practices, is unethical. This first sense of representation thus relates to the second: to speak for others depends upon claims to define others, that is to say who they really are or what their interests are, which is in itself an oppressive relationship. A rejection of representation is essential to direct or participatory democracy as well as to poststructuralist critiques of essentialism. According to Deleuze, it was Foucault 'who taught the intellectuals of his generation the indignity of speaking for others' (Patton, 2000: 146). In an interview Deleuze said, 'we ridiculed representation and said it was finished, but we failed to draw the consequences of this "theoretical" conversation -- to appreciate the theoretical fact that only those directly concerned can speak in a practical way on their own behalf' (Foucault

1977b:209). The critique of representation is, at the same time, an anticapitalist sentiment. The apparatuses upon which capitalist social relations depend -- factories, schools, prisons, hospitals and the military -- function through disciplinary techniques, producing docility.

> 'What was then being formed was a policy of coercions that act on the body, a calculated manipulation of its elements, its gestures, its behavior. The human body was entering a machinery of power that explores it, breaks it down and rearranges it. […] Thus, discipline produces subjected and practiced bodies, "docile" bodies' (Foucault 1977a: 138-9).

Thus, discipline aims to produce 'the obedient subject, the individual subjected to habits, rules, orders, and authority that is exercised continually around him [sic] and upon him, and which he must allow to function automatically in him' (ibid. pp128-129). These docile bodies, then, are not only obedient to the authority of the State apparatus and the figure of the Boss, but the habits of gender and sexual orientation, among others. Resistance, however, is possible. Alternatively, 'practices of freedom' (Foucault, 1988a) resist representation and produce very different subjectivities. Such is a key argument of anarchism. The question of anarchist practicality is not whether all individuals now are immediately capable of self-management, equality and freedom, but whether human beings are capable of becoming so. If we reject essentialist notions of 'human nature', then we must at least accept that it is a possibility. Consistent with Foucault, Carole Pateman points out, 'participation develops and fosters the very qualities necessary for it; the more individuals participate the better able they become to do so.' (1970: 42-43).

The phrase 'policing sexualities' is comprehensible only because we recognise the commonalities of State policing operations and the practices of violence, sometimes symbolic, that punish transgressions of rules regarding sexuality (or behaviours associated with sexuality, especially gender performance); these rules are, of course, not universal but produced within the context of particular practices, which are, in turn, tied to local identities. While the police are at the most blatant and visible location of the exercise of State violence and of State claims to sovereignty (Agamben, 2000), those who find themselves exercising violence to maintain identity boundaries do not necessarily wear uniforms. Then again, a wo/man with long hair and lipstick who gets dirty looks (or worse) in a lesbian/straight bar is experiencing violence precisely because s/he does not conform to an unwritten dress code. If we accept Foucault's analysis, that power is diffuse, relational and it 'comes from below' (1990: 94), then the policing operation of sexual orientation and that of the State are not

necessarily so different. Sexual orientation does not require its own professional police, though arguably they exist, for the same reason that a State apparatus cannot rely entirely on police to maintain power. Both sexual orientation and states do, however, both require policing - whether official or unofficial, self-directed or through violence directed towards others.

The Value of Difference

In keeping with the principle of antirepresentation, the second ethical principle of anarchist poststructuralism is 'that alternative practices, all things being equal, ought to be allowed to flourish and even to be promoted' (May, 1994:133). This principle, too, is a key commitment of queer theory. The first axiom of Eve Sedgwick's germinal work, *Epistemology of the Closet*, is that 'people are different from each other' (1990:22). As I highlighted in the previous chapter, issues of difference are essential to debates on the politics of sexuality. Queer theory, in keeping with its anarchist and poststructuralist roots, advocates a politics of difference. Its refusal to articulate an ethical principle of antirepresentation has resulted in a misunderstanding of this commitment to difference. For example, Sheila Jefferies (1993) has suggested that paedophilia, and Stephen Angelides (1994) rape, might also constitute sexual difference that would then be necessarily promoted by queer politics. However, rape certainly involves representation in the sense of not listening to what someone else wants (or does not want); paedophilia, depending on how one defines it, is very likely to do so as well. Thus, in these cases, all things are not equal. So, promoting difference is not to advocate 'anarchy' in the sense of a lack of ethical standards, but anarchy in the sense of people deciding for themselves how to live their lives without being told (or feeling) that they are doing it wrong. From a rejection of the coherent, rational, individual self in favour of a fluidity and multiplicity of desires embodied within each 'individual' to a rejection of over deterministic notions of structure for a decentralised conception of power, poststructuralist anarchist thought prioritises the value and necessity of difference over identity.

Of Ends and Means

Finally, poststructuralist ethics can be understood in terms of consequentialism: that the ends cannot be separated from the means. Consequentialism has deep roots within the

anarchist tradition, exemplified by Bakunin's debates with Marx over the possibility of a 'workers' State' withering away to result in an egalitarian society. Bakunin's recognition that oppressive power is not centralised within capitalism and that history is a continuous process whereby the ends cannot be separated from the means is decidedly congruent with French poststructuralism. Furthermore, his accurate prediction of a 'red bureaucracy' suggests that history is a continuous process and that the ends are inseperable from, and cannot justify, the means. Consequentialism is potentially authoritarian, as in the example of utilitarianism, in which the aim must always be the greatest happiness for the greatest number. Rather, May (1994, 1995) suggests that poststructuralist anarchism advocates a multivalue consequentialism, in which the ends and the means must be the same and in which those ends and means are based on diverse values in particular locations. This basis of ethics is consistent with poststructuralist notion of both social reality and individual identity as being continuously produced. If societies, relationships and individuals are all continuously produced, if history is a continuous process, that ethically is not possible to separate ends from means. As Italian poststructuralist theorist Giorgio Agamben writes, there are only 'means without end' (2000). Unlike Karl Marx or Francis Fukuyama (1992), poststructuralist theorists argue that there can be no 'end of history', whether communist or capitalist.

Sexual Orientation as State-form

The intersections of anarchism and poststructuralism also offer more specific conceptual tools in order to develop an understanding of sexual orientation and a politics able to produce its demise. Here, I turn to Deleuze and Guattari's concepts of the 'nomadic war-machine' and 'state-forms' to explore further the links between critiques of identity politics and of the State incorporating the notion of consent.

Rather than using Rahman's notion of 'institutionalised procedures', I look to Deleuze and Guattari's conception of the State 'as abstract machine rather than institution, instantiated not only at the macropolitical but also at the micropolitical level, reliant upon local practices that sustain it, and offering always the possibility of escape' (May, 1994: 108). Governments, of course, can be understood as concrete institutions. To perceive them as such is to fail to recognise the manner in which macropolitical practices (that produce the appearance of 'institutions') are themselves products of interwoven micropolitical relationships and practices.

Deleuze and Guattari use the notion of state-forms to describe micro and macro level operations that have a relationship of mutual dependence with the State and which serve its goals of control, maintaining the appearance of centralised power. 'The purpose of the state-form is to bind all nomadism to certain structures, to make sure that its creativity does not overflow certain boundaries or certain identificatory categories' (May, 1994: 105). Thus, the state-form helps to fulfil the essential function of the State, which is to conserve, to control, to capture. The State can be understood as 'a process of capture of flows of all kinds, populations, commodities or commerce, money or capital' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987:386). But the State is not able to capture all flows, to control all creativity. Some things escape. These are the creative forces of nomadism: 'not tied to any given social arrangement; they are continuously creative, but their creativity is not naturally bound to any given types or categories of product. Such nomadism is central to Deleuze's thought, because it provides the possibility of conceiving new and different forms of practice, and thus resisting current forms of identification as unwanted constraints' (May, 1994: 104-5).

The mode by which nomadic creativity is controlled Deleuze and Guattari call 'overcoding', which they say 'is the operation that constitutes the essence of the State' (1977:199). 'In overcoding, disparate practices are brought together under a single category or principle, and are given their comprehensibility as variations of that category or principle. What was different becomes merely another mode of the same. In this way, the proliferation of distinct practices produced by nomadic creativity is limited to the creation of a single standard or certain standards by which those practices are judged' (May, 1994: 106). The State functions by overcoding practices, often through codification in law, in order to enable or constrain the continuance of particular practices. Some practices enabled by the State may further serve to constrain or even eliminate other practices. It is at this micropolitical level that the state-forms also operate through overcoding, often through direct or indirect support from State apparatuses.

I suggest that sexual orientation identity can be understood in terms of the state-form. Even before the development of heterosexual and homosexual identities within 'Western' cultures, disciplinary apparatuses, including those of the State and Church, were active in their efforts to define standards for sexual behaviour. The possibility, or rather the perceived possibility, of procreation was sometimes defined as the only justification for sexual pleasure. Indeed, as I mentioned above, heterosexuality was first defined as a mental illness suffered by

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those who expressed strong desires for sexual activity with members of 'the other' sex, apart from the respectable necessity of procreation. Heterosexuality developed as a new state-form, one in which a variety of practices were compressed into a single psychiatric category. Homosexuality and bisexuality have been constructed as variations on a theme. Sexual orientation can be understood as a set of state-forms in that a wide variety of practices (including sexual, romantic and gendered) are defined and judged in terms of their capacity to be categorised within, or association with, one of three boxes. Nomadic sexualities (potentially including bisexualities where 'bisexuality' does not become itself become fixed and fixing, where only the state-forms of heterosexuality and homosexuality exist) are rendered incomprehensible at best and deviant at worst. The maintenance of sexual orientation as a comprehensible social category, in the face of much greater sexual diversity, is linked to the State through a wide variety of mechanisms. A comprehensive exploration of this relationship would be a substantial project in and of itself. Obvious examples include marriage, sex education, and clearly discriminatory or anti-discriminatory laws. Other prime examples are found in sexual orientation identity rights movements. Arguments for 'operational essentialism' (Spivak, cited in Butler, 1990), 'strategic essentialism' (Fuss, 1989), or 'necessary fictions' (Weeks 1995), including Gamson's (1996) assertion that sometimes identity politics is the only possible option, come from efforts to be included within the State or to be represented.

Relationships & Emotions

Any attempt to understand the ongoing production of 'sexual orientation' in everyday life – indeed the ongoing production everyday life itself – must acknowledge the often intense emotionality of the human relationships which produce these phenomena. With regard to the hierarchical production of sexual orientation categories, one emotion in particular is frequently cited by various commentators from academic theorists to pop musicians – shame (e.g., Pet Shop Boys, 1987; Stychin, 2005; Warner, 1999). Clearly, the emotional roots of sexual orientation are a complex rhizomic assemblage (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988) rather than a

singular emotion. Saying that, shame may be considered a key component to this assemblage[3].

Thomas Scheff, who has written on the role of emotions in the maintenance of social organisation, helps to demonstrates the importance of shame (1990); an argument which can be seen as supportive of the anarchist tradition. The link between shame and anarchism can be seen in the research of Helen Lewis who, sounding like a disciple of Kropotkin[4], argued that humans have inherent tendencies toward co-operation as social animals. The second part of her argument, in Scheff's words, is 'that shame is the most important of the social emotions because it arises when there is a threat to the social bond. In her scheme, shame has a signal function, alerting one to threats to the bond. Just as feelings of pride signal a secure bond, feelings of shame signal a threatened bond' (p 79-80). Scheff combines Goffman's social analysis of deference with Lewis's psychological one of internal emotions to produce his 'deference-emotion system'. Scheff advocates this as a system for understanding the basis of social bond as emotions, rather than as overt forms of sanction or reward. Compatible with the poststructuralist approach just described, this argument not only provides support for decentralised authority as the basis of social organisation advocated by anarchists, but in fact demonstrates that it already exists. The only minor violation is an essentialist argument that humans are inherently social. This, I suggest, is an unstated presumption of most sociological theory, poststructuralist or otherwise. The sociability of humans is not essentialist in any deterministic sense -- cross-cultural study clearly demonstrates that there are many diverse ways in which to be sociable. Finally, sociability is not essential to humans in a way that differentiates 'us' from other animals as does the humanism of which poststructuralist theorists are so critical.

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3   At this point, one may well expect a turn to the psychoanalytic tradition in order to interrogate intersections of emotions, desires, relationships and social organisation. Those poststructuralist theorists, whose work I argue may be understood as anarchist, have themselves engaged critically, and often productively, with the writings of Freud and Lacan (Butler, 1990, 1993; Deleuze and Guattari, 1977, 1987; Foucault, 1965, 1990). While some have gone so far as to suggest that Lacan himself may be understood as part as the anti-authoritarian left tradition (e.g. Newman, 2001), others argue that Lacan's work is essentially normalising (Robinson, 2005) or reductive. 'For over a decade, I have been sifting through the remnants of psychoanalysis in search of what can be submitted to new theoretical elaborations which avoid, as much as possible, the reductiveness of Freudian and Lacanian formulations' (Guattari, 1998). Rather that turning directly to psychoanalysis myself, I appreciate the sifting labour of others more qualified. The following analysis of the social importance of shame includes Lacan as reworked by Butler, but sharing a scepticism of psychoanalysis with Foucault, Guattari, Robinson and others, the analysis primarily draws on the work of sociologists.

4   Kropotkin (1987 [1902]) is famous for his challenge to social Darwinism, arguing instead that mutual aid, or co-operation, is of far greater importance to biological and social evolution than is competition.

The deference-emotion system draws on the insight of interactionist sociology, particularly Cooley and Goffman, that our understanding of ourselves is based on our ability to see ourselves through others' eyes. A degree of shame is necessary for us to maintain some sense of shared standards, which in turn are necessary for meaningful social relationships. This capacity for self-management, as social beings, depends upon empathy. An anarchist critique must point out that our capacity for empathy is greatly inhibited by systematic competition and hierarchy (Kohn, 1992). It is difficult to imagine how we look through the eyes of others if we see them as objects to be overcome, underlings to command, or authorities to obey. Furthermore, Scheff described how the important role of shame in self-management could become 'pathological', leading to rigid or excessive conformity. To illustrate pathological shame, Scheff returned to Asch's classic social psychology study in which most participants were found to state an opinion concurrent with the rest of a group (who were collaborators presented as participants) despite that opinion being obviously wrong. Asch's qualitative data demonstrates that the decision to go along with the group against one's own beliefs was based either on overt shame or an obsessive bypass shame where participants denied the fact that they were correct and the group was wrong. Even those who resisted conformity felt a sense of shame, but they were not overcome by it.

Scheff's notion of overwhelming pathological shame that demands rigid and excessive conformity provides one basis of support for Deleuze and Guattari's state-form, in particular, and anarchism in general. Indeed, when applied to sexual state-forms, the compatibility of these concepts becomes increasingly obvious. Michael Warner (1999) opens his thesis on the relationships between representation, sexual shame and ethics by drawing similar connections.

> Sooner or later, happily or unhappily, almost everyone fails to control his or her sex life. Perhaps as compensation, almost everyone sooner or later also succumbs to temptation to control *someone else's* sex life. Most people cannot quite rid themselves of the sense that controlling the sex of others, far from being unethical, is where morality begins. Shouldn't it be possible to allow everyone sexual autonomy, in a way consistent with everyone else's sexual autonomy? As simple as this ethical principle sounds, we have not come close to bringing it into practice (p1, original emphasis).

Of course, if we reject the dichotomy of sexuality/society (see e.g. Weeks, 1985), that is to say

that like 'society', 'sexuality' is an effect of social relationships, this statement may be understood as a call for anarchy. Everyone should be allowed autonomy in a way consistent with everyone else's autonomy. According to Scheff and Warner, pathological shame encourages us to try to control ourselves and others. These efforts to control depend upon representation -- fitting people, relationships and desires into boxes and judging them in terms of those boxes. In terms of sex, this results in what Warner refers to as 'hierarchies of shame' (p 195) or what Rubin called 'the sexual hierarchy' (1992: 282).

Scheff acknowledges that while shame may be a biological aspect of humanity, pathological shame is certainly a product of social conditions: 'adult shame is doubly social: shame arises in social monitoring of the self, and shame itself often becomes a further source of shame, *depending upon the particular situation and the normative structure of the culture*' (Scheff, 1990: 84, my emphasis). Hierarchies, I suggest, are the key 'structure' that enable shame to develop into pathological shame. Shame can only become a further source of shame if emotions are something to be ashamed of. If, as Scheff and Lewis have argued, shame is the direct consequence of damaging social bonds, then hierarchies, which are based on the continual damage of social bonds through domination must reject shame in order to exist. The hierarchy of the rational over the emotional is necessary to reject shame; it is also often tied to hierarchies of masculinity over femininity. This supports feminist critiques of authoritarianism, in general, and bureaucracy (Byington et al, 1991; Charles, 2000; Collins et al, 1989; Daly, 1988; Ferguson, 1984; Matthews, 1994; Reinelt, 1994; Stedward, 1987) and the State (Brown, 1995; Elshtain, 1981) in particular, as masculine. Furthermore, as the hierarchy of normative heterosexualities over other sexual possibilities provides crucial support to the ongoing production of masculinity and femininity as a hierarchical binary (see e.g., Butler, 1990, 1993; Connell, 1995a, 1995b; Rich, 1999 [1979]), it should be unsurprising that sexuality is an area rich in pathological shame. Finally, the dominance of discourses which privatise inequality (Brown, 1995) means that oppression results in shame on the part of the oppressed (see Bartky, 1990, especially Chapter 6).

Focusing on sexual orientation identity more specifically, rejection of difficult feelings, including shame, is integral to the continuous production of the hetero/homo division. Judith Butler's psychoanalytic analysis of heterosexual identity is consistent with Scheff's notion of shame.

there is a linkage between homosexuality and abjection, indeed, a possible identification *with* an abject homosexuality at the heart of heterosexual identification. This economy of repudiation suggests that heterosexuality and homosexuality are mutually exclusive phenomena, that they can only be made to coincide through rendering the one culturally viable and the other a transient and imaginary affair. The abjection of homosexuality can take place only through identification with that abjection, an identification that must be disavowed, an identification that one fears to make only because one has already made it, an identification that institutes that abjection and sustains it (1993:111-112).

In Scheff's terms, then, the feeling of abjection toward homosexuality produces an initial feeling of shame, and if heterosexual identity depends upon feeling ashamed of the shame of one's identification with abject homosexuality, then pathological shame must result. Indeed, such an answer might provide a better understanding for the care that many people take in order to prevent being thought of as non-heterosexual, even in social contexts where same-sex desire is openly accepted, or perhaps even applauded as radical or transgressive. This rejection is not limited to heterosexuality, however. Butler further argues that an exclusionary homosexual identity, which is 'a political necessity to *specify* gay and lesbian identity over and against it sensible opposite, heterosexuality' (p 113), denies the interdependence of heterosexual and homosexual identities.

Moreover, a full-scale denial of that interrelationship can constitute a rejection of heterosexuality that is to some degree an identification *with* a rejected heterosexuality. Important to this economy, however, is the refusal to recognise this identification that is, as it were, already made, the refusal which absently designates the domain of a specifically gay melancholia, a loss which cannot be recognised and, hence, cannot be mourned. For gay or lesbian identity-position to sustain its appearance as coherent, heterosexuality must remain in that rejected and repudiated place. Paradoxically, its heterosexual *remains* must be *sustained* precisely through the insistence on seamless coherence of a specifically gay identity (1993:112).

Thus, homosexual identity also depends upon pathological shame, in its failure to acknowledge its rejection of heterosexuality. Even worse, the pathological shame of homosexual identity and that of heterosexual identity are mutually sustaining and mutually dependent. And, of course, those who claim gendered sexual identities other than heterosexual or homosexual (e.g., bisexual) are likely to be encouraged to reject both heterosexual and homosexual identities by the strength of the hetero/homo division. This multiple rejection

provides further opportunities for pathological shame. The state-form of sexual orientation is maintained not simply through interpersonal relations of power, but also through intrapersonal (yet still social) emotional states.

Pathological shame in general, and sexuality in particular, must be addressed for anarchist politics to be both effective and consistent. At the same time, the constraining effect of non-pathological shame is crucial for recognising human beings' capacity for organisation without domination -- anarchy. One could interpret Scheff and Lewis's arguments as consistent with so many anarchist ones: namely, that it is not laws that discourage us from harming one another physically or emotionally, but shame. While 'law and order' depend on our fear of shame, resulting in pathological shame, anarchy requires acceptance of all emotions including shame. Failure to accept shame supports the ongoing production of domination and conformity. This can be seen clearly in the relationship between pathological shame and sexual hierarchies and anxieties (Rubin, 1992; Warner, 1995).

Conclusion: Toward Nomadic Alternatives

Sexual orientation, as a state-form, functions to bind diverse sexual desires and practices into particular categories with their own rules. Heterosexuality, homosexuality and bisexuality are the main categories, each of which are defined within local contexts interdependent with other social characteristics such as sexual, religious, racialised, economic and gendered constructions. The realm of sexuality, as with any other social practices, involves its own forms of nomadic creativity. Nomadism, I suggest, provides a conceptual tool which incorporates the strengths of queer, while improving upon its limitations. Although, as I have suggested above, making explicit the anarchism of queer politics addresses many of the criticisms that have been brought to it, the term queer itself comes with some baggage which is difficult to escape: the connotations of homosexuality and of transgression. Placing homosexuality at the centre of a politics aiming to eliminate the concept of sexual orientation is potentially problematic. While prefigurative politics are potentially transgressive, transgression is not always prefigurative. My project could easily be understood as a kind of queer anarchism, but I prefer to formulate it as an anarchism which places relationships and ethics at the centre of its definition. In poststructuralist terms, both subjectivities and macro level social organisation are produced through relationships. An anarchist poststructuralist ethic of relationships rejects representation and the conditions which result in pathological

shame, but instead promotes respect for diversity and acknowledges life – political, personal and biological -- as an ongoing process. This approach incorporates what might be referred to as 'sexuality' without emphasising the sexual as more open to fluidity (or nomadism) than other aspects of relationships, as queer sometimes does (Martin, 1994). An emphasis on relationships also emphasises the feminist heritage of my politics, in particular questioning a neat separation between the personal and the political. Finally, it was, in large part, through research on relationships that I came to develop this (relational) anarchist politics of sexual orientation. The next chapter offers a story of how this research project and these political ideas developed.